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ABSTRACT
Traditional Blockchain Sharding approaches can only tolerate up
to n/3 of nodes being adversary because they rely on the hyper-
geometric distribution to make a failure (an adversary does not
have n/3 of nodes globally but can manipulate the consensus of a
Shard) hard to happen. The system must maintain a large Shard
size (the number of nodes inside a Shard) to sustain the low failure
probability so that only a small number of Shards may exist. In this
paper, we present a new approach of Blockchain Sharding that can
withstand up to n/2 of nodes being bad. We categorise the nodes
into different classes, and every Shard has a fixed number of nodes
from different classes. We prove that this design is much more se-
cure than the traditional models (only have one class) and the Shard
size can be reduced significantly. In this way, many more Shards
can exist, and the transaction throughput can be largely increased.
The improved Blockchain Sharding approach is promising to serve
as the foundation for decentralised autonomous organisations and
decentralised database.
KEYWORDS
Decentralised ledger, Blockchain, Blockchain Sharding, PBFT
ACM Reference Format:
Yibin Xu and YangyuHuang. 2020. An n/2 Byzantine node tolerate Blockchain
Sharding approach. In The 35th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Com-
puting (SAC ’20), March 30-April 3, 2020, Brno, Czech Republic. ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 5 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3341105.3374069
1 INTRODUCTION
Blockchain Sharding is an approach that implements the idea of
Sharding [1] in blockchain to increase the transaction throughput
without raising the bandwidth and processing requirements of
nodes. By allowingmultiple committees (Shards) running in parallel,
the nodes inside every Shard solely process the data in their Shard,
which leads to the system throughput increasing a lot.
Because the essence of a blockchain is in being decentralised and
permissionless, and so it should allow as many devices as possible
to participate in the system, the idea of Blockchain Sharding is
a promising solution to solve the dilemma between increasing
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performance on one hand and increasing decentralisation on the
other hand. Previous work on Sharding has explored various ideas
(Elastico [2], RSCoin [3], OmniLedger [4], RapidChain [5]) that can
withstand up to 1/4 or 1/3 of network nodes being malicious. These
approaches only support a small number of Shards in the system,
or, equivalently, they require a large number of nodes in each Shard,
both of which impact performance negatively.
In this paper, we propose a new Blockchain Sharding approach
that can withstand up to n/2 of malicious nodes in the system.
Compared to other methods, the probability that the malicious
nodes will control a Shard is lower, and only a small number of
nodes are required for every Shard to function securely. So that
the communication costs inside every Shard are smaller and more
Shards can exist in parallel, and that improves the transaction per
second globally.
2 BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING HYPOTHESIS
If we are inside a forest recording the time when trees fall, it is not
necessarily for everyone to hear every fall of the tree to maintain
the fairness of the system. The fact that a tree falls and the time
when a tree falls is correct when it is recognised by most people
around the tree assumed these persons have not colluded. With
a sufficient number of people, if they are assigned randomly and
completely distributed to subareas in the forest and are reassigned
time by time to avoid the accumulation of adversary power, collu-
sion is hard to happen (expected to occur in years). As long as the
random and distributed assignment is secured, follow the principle
of proportionality, taking control of a subarea requires a significant
effort similar to taken the whole system when there is only one
area.
In particular, this proposal is secure when (1) only people as-
signed to a subarea of the forest are legal to record the information
about this subarea. (2) any person cannot control or predict which
subarea it is about to be assigned in. (3) the assignment follows a
globally recognised rule, not by the arbitrary willing of some spe-
cific group of superior people. (4) people are periodically reassigned.
(5) the number of people inside every Shard is large enough.
If the above criteria are fulfilled, and with a sufficient number of
honest people, one would only need to check what is the common
recognised time of falling for a tree of their interest from the subarea
where this tree belongs to, it is not necessary for themselves to hear
the falling. In this way, people do not need to have super hearing
power when the forest is dense. Instead, they only need to focus
on monitoring the subarea where they are assigned to.
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Figure 1: The philosophy of Blockchain Sharding
2.1 Failure Probability
The probability of obtaining no less than x adversary nodes when
randomly picking a Shard sizedm (m is the number of nodes inside
the Shard) can be calculated by the cumulative hypergeometric
distribution function without replacement from a population of n
nodes. LetX denote the random variable corresponding to the num-
ber of adversary nodes in the sampled group. The failure probability
for one committee is at most
Pr [X > [m/2]] =
m∑
X=[m/2]
(tX )(n−tm−X )
(nm )
(1)
which calculates the probability that no less than X nodes are
adversary in a group of m nodes and t is the number of nodes
controlled by the adversary globally.
The hypergeometric distribution depends directly on the total
population size (i.e.,n). Due ton can change time by time in a permis-
sionless network (open-membership), the failure probability might
be affected consequently. To maintain the desired failure probabil-
ity, each Shard in RapidChain runs a consensus in pre-determined
intervals (e.g. once a week), to agree on a new committee size,
based on which, the committee will accept more nodes to join the
committee in future epochs.
Figure 2 shows the maximum probability to fail with n = 2000
andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards.
As can be seen from the result, the system has a very high failure
chance when the adversary taken n/2 of nodes, even if there are
only 7 Shards. That is the main reason why all the Blockchain
Sharding approaches so far are only withstanding up to n/3 of
nodes being bad.
If every iteration lasts for 30 minutes, then the time to secure
a fail with the 10−6 failure chance with n/3 of nodes being bad is
over 57 years. There cannot be more than 10 Shards when n = 2000
and a 10−6 failure chance is maintained. The block interval (length
of every synchronisation iteration) cannot be shortened; otherwise,
it also reduces the time to fail. In Nakamoto blockchain, a block is
published in every 10minute with over 1000 transactions inside the
block. Thus, the transactions embedded to theNakamoto blockchain
per hour is over 6000. If we set the same block size for the Blockchain
Sharding approaches, with 30 minutes block interval, it can only
process over 20000 transactions per hour with 10 Shards. However,
considering all the additional designs, the lowered Byzantine fault
tolerate rate, the slowed block interval and the failure in the next
0 200 400 600
Number of Shards globally
 7
 6
 5
 4
 3
 2
 1
0
M
ax
im
um
 c
ha
nc
e 
(lo
g 1
0)
0 200 400 600
Number of Shards globally
−0.25
−0.20
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
M
ax
im
um
 c
ha
nc
e 
(lo
g 1
0)
8 9 10111213141516171819
Number of Shards globally
−7.5
−7.0
−6.5
−6.0
−5.5
−5.0
−4.5
−4.0
−3.5
M
ax
im
 m
 c
ha
nc
e 
(lo
g 1
0)
5 10 15
Number of Shards globally
−0.30
−0.25
−0.20
−0.15
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
M
ax
im
um
 c
ha
nc
e 
(lo
g 1
0)
t = n/3 = 666 t = n/2 = 1000
Figure 2: the chance to fail when n = 2000, t = n/3, t = n/2
andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards;
57 years, people may wonder whether a tripled performance worth
all the costs.
3 THE N/2 BYZANTINE NODE TOLERATED
BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING APPROACH
In this section, we our approach in more detail.
3.1 Our Hypothesis
Instead of recording the time of tree fallings inside a forest, imagine
nodes are juries inside the courtrooms. We rule that a sentence is
made when more than a predefined T number of people inside the
jury sized m reached a consensus (the predefined T must larger
than 0.5 ×m). Every jury should havem people inside, and these
people are fromm different occupations. For example, let’s assume
m = 5, a jury should have five people: a teacher, a social worker,
a doctor, a police officer, and a businessperson. Then, there are at
least ten teachers, ten social workers, ten doctors, ten police officers,
and ten businesspeople for ten juries to run in parallel. A person
can choose an occupation by itself before being assigned to a jury,
and it cannot change its occupation inside the jury. There is a court
office which in charge of the jury membership issues. Whenever
there comem new people inm occupations, the court office will
add these people by reorganising the membership of every existing
jury and then form a new jury. Jury hypothesis is distinguished
from the forest hypothesis because if the adversary controls two
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social workers, they cannot live inside the same jury; however, they
can be inside the same sub-area of the forest when recording the
tree falling time. The difficulty in fulfilling the Jury hypothesis is
to divide the people intom occupations equally.
3.2 Jury Membership
A new participant needs to choose an occupation and report to the
court office before the court office can assign it to a jury (Shard).
When adding new people to the court system, the court office should
give preference to the people of seniority (the people who reported
to the office earlier but has not yet been added to the system).
Assumingm = 5 and six new people in five different occupations
are waiting to be added to the system, person A and person B are
in the same occupation. The court office would add person A to the
system with the other new people in other occupations if person A
reported to the office earlier than B. Person B will then be put in
the pending status until there comes four new people in the other
four occupations.
The court office periodically publishes the number of people
in every occupation who reported to the office and is waiting to
be assigned to a jury. So that when a new participant decides its
occupation, it will check the pending queue of every occupation and
choose an unpopular occupation to get into the system quicker. If it
lines in a long queue, it will need to wait until there come enough
people to fill in the shorter queues. Because new participants tend to
line in the shorter queue, the number of people in every occupation
is automatically close to each other (tend to be equal in the long
run). If people change its occupation after reporting to the court
office, it will be placed to the tail of the pending queue of the new
occupation. Thus, changing an occupation wastes the position in
the original pending queue.
The person, regardless if it is inside a jury or in the waiting queue,
should work (generate PoW s) in every fixed time window. Thus
the same as the other blockchain sharding models, the adversary
who has half of the overall energy can only have half of the people
in the system.
Table 1,2,3,4 and 5 show the procedure of adding people into
the system. In this procedure, we rule that whenever there are at
least four pending people in every occupation, adding starts. Table
1 shows the pending queue published by the court office at the
moment one. Table 2 shows the pending queues when the adding
conditions are meet after moment one before moment two. Table 3
shows the pending queue at the moment two. Table 4 shows the
people in the court system at the moment one. Table 5 shows the
people in the court system at the moment two where some new
people are added.
Table 1: The pending queues published by the court office at
moment 1. Letters in red colors are pending people.
Occupation I II III IV V
A
B
C E
D F G H I
Number of Pending person 4 2 1 1 1
Table 2: The pending queues aftermoment 1 beforemoment
2. letters in blue color stand for the pending people who re-
ported to the office after moment 1 before moment 2. Be-
cause the minimum length of the queues reached four (pre-
defined adding parameter), the front four people of every
queue should be added to the system in moment 2.
Occupation I II III IV V
U V
A Q R S T
Add to court system -> B M N O P
C E J K L
D F G H I
Number of Pending person 4 4 5 4 5
Table 3: The pending queues published by the court office at
moment 2. Selected people in Table 2 has been assigned to
the court system.
Occupation I II III IV V
U V
Number of Pending person 0 0 1 0 1
Table 4: People in the court system at moment 1. There is
only one jury running.
Ocp
Court 1
Occupation I !
Occupation II @
Occupation III #
Occupation IV $
Occupation V *
Table 5: People in the court system at moment 2. All mem-
bership is adjusted with four more juries formed.
Ocp
Court 1 2 3 4 5
Occupation I A C B D !
Occupation II @ Q M F E
Occupation III R N # J G
Occupation IV S O H K $
Occupation V T * P I L
As can be seen from the adding procedure, if the Adversary is
not in a very long queue, there is no gain for the Adversary to
change the occupation once it reports to the court office. If it does
so, it goes to the tail of another queue, leaving its original place to
others. Then, it still needs to wait until there comes more people in
other queues before it can be added to the system.
3.3 Failure Probability
Table 6 shows a court schedule table for ten courts run in parallel
with the jury sized five, and ten people in each of every occupation.
In Table 6, A refers to the adversary person, H refers to the honest
person.
For a s number of the jury meeting to be held in parallel, there
is a s number of people in each occupation. Let the adversary has
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Table 6: Court Jury Schedule
Ocp
Court 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Occupation I A A A A A H H H H H
Occupation II H A H A H A H A H A
Occupation III A H A H A H A H A H
Occupation IV H A H H A A H A H A
Occupation V H H H H A A A A H A
Ai number of the person in Occupation i; then the chance for the
adversary to secure a manipulated sentence is (assuming without
loss of generality that the adversary puts all its nodes into the front
T occupations)
Pr [T ] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
(2)
where T is the number of the person the adversary must take in a
jury to manipulate the sentence.
To derive the maximised Pr [T ], we want ∏Ti=1Ai to be max-
imised because s is the same. Let the adversary has AD number of
people inside the system (Court Jury Schedule), thenAD =
∑m
i=1Ai .
To let the value of
∏T
i=1Ai maximise, we consider
Ai = ⌈(t/T )⌉, i ∈ [1, t mod T ] (3)
Ai = ⌊(t/T )⌋, i ∈ (t mod T ,T ] (4)
This scenario is themaximised because given any positive integer
X ,
X ∗ X > (X − 1) ∗ (X + 1) = X ∗ X − 1. (5)
Thus,
Pr [T ]max ≈ ( AD
T ∗ s )
T (6)
IfT =m (all the people in the jury should reach the same verdict
when making a sentence), then
Pr [T =m]max ≈ ( AD
s ∗m )
m (7)
Let AD = s∗m2 (half of the overall population) then
Pr [T =m]max ≈ (12 )
m (8)
Though the adversary cannotmanipulate a sentencewhen it does
not haveT people inside a Shard, it can halt a sentence to be reached
when it hasm −T + 1 number of the nodes in a Shard. Then this
sentence cannot be made until the next court (the group of juries
are re-selected). Thus, to make the system function more smoothly,
we want T ≈ [m/2] while meeting the security threshold (e.g. 10−6
failure chance). Figure 3 shows the maximum failure chance with
different s , n = s ∗m = 2000, T = 0.7 ∗m and AD = 1000 (1/2
fraction of the overall population).
As can be seen from the result, when there are ten Shards and
n/2 people being evil, the failure chance is below 10−20, which
significantly outperformed the RapidChain at below 10−6 when it
has ten Shards and only n/3 nodes being evil. If we set the block
interval to be 30minutes , then it takes over 1015 years to fail the
system. If it is 10minutes (the same as Nakamoto blockchain), it
still takes over 1014 years to fail. If we maintain the 10−6 failure
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Figure 3: the chance to fail with different s when n = 2000
andm = n/s where s is the number of Shards;
chances at this circumstance with T = 0.7 ∗m, then there can be
33 Shards at the same time.
4 POTENTIAL USAGE
It has been a long-standing question for how to open the member-
ship in a distributed system while maintaining the performance
of distributed jobs as well as the integrity and correctness of the
job results [6, 7]. How to enable nodes in the different background
to participate and tolerant them go offline without notice while
stabilised the system as a whole [8]. By increasing the Byzantine-
fault-tolerant rate as well as the performance of the Blockchain
Sharding approach, the improved Blockchain Sharding approach
may solve these standing problems. For example, a data grid and
distributed database can allow their users to be a part of the pro-
cessing system. IoT devices can be governed decentralised by the
transparent rule of laws [9–11], in this way, waived the concern
over privacy or even espionage for smart home assistants.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed a new Blockchain Sharding approach
that maintains the system integrity when there are at most n/2
fraction of adversary nodes. Compared to the previous work, the
required number of nodes per Shard is much lower and more Shards
are allowed to exist with the same security threshold.
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